EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 A YEAR. SINGLE COPIES, 85 CENT8
EDITORIAL BOARD.
G. S. ARNOLD, Chairman.
SETH W. BALDWIN. JOHN W. JoY.
BIRDSEY E. CASE. THOMAS F. PORTER, JR.
DAVID J. DAVIS. CHARLES A. ROBERTS.
JOHN C. DUREY. MATT S. WALTON.
C. HADLAI HULL.
FRANK KENNA, Business Manager.
Published monthly during the Academic year, by students of the Yale Law School.
P. o Address, Box 893, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JOURNAL discontinued at the expiration of his subscrition
notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise it is assumed that a continuation of the subscrition
is desired.
The YALE LAW JOURNAL wishes-to ann6unce the election of the
following men to its editorial board:
From the class of 19o6, H. F. Hamlin, H. V. Jones, F. B. Win-
throp; from the class of 1907, J. M. Forsyth, F. P. McEvoy,
G. S. Munson, G. E. Parks, T. D. Thacher, G. S. Van Schaick.
LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER THE CONTRACTS OF A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION.
The case of Graham et al. v. Folsom et al., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
245, recently decided, presents an interesting question. Is the exer-
cise by a state of the right to alter or destroy its municipal corpora-
tions effectual to impair the obligation of municipal contracts?
The United States Supreme Court in the above case held that it was
ineffectual.
At common law a corporation, either private or municipal,
upon dissolution became civilly dead. The effect of this was that
land belonging to the corporation reverted to the grantor and
that debts owing to and by the corporation were extinguished.
The common law rule that the debts of a private corporation
were extinguished upon its dissolution, has been so far modified
that a court of equity will now take hold of its property and ad-
minister it for the benefit of its creditors and stockholders. The
obligation of contract survives dissolution, and the contract may be
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enforced by a court of equity, so far as to subject for their satis-
faction any property held by it at the time. In equity its property
constitutes a trust fund for the payment of its debts; and if a munici-
pal corporation upon its dissolution has property, a court of equity
will take possession of it for the benefit of the creditors. Brough-
ton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 266, 268.
The right of the state to repeal the charter of one of its munici-
palities cannot be questioned. But while the charter may be repealed
at the pleasure of the legislature, the contracts of the municipal
corporation made while it was still in existence may still be enforced
against the property held by it at the time of the appeal. Meri-
wether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472. Judge Dillon in his excellent
work lays down the principle that legislative acts respecting the
public powers of municipal corporations, not being contracts, may
be changed at pleasure when the constitutional rights of creditors
and others are not invaded. Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
(4th ed.) 105.
It is not within the power of a legislature by a repeal of a char-
ter of a municipal corporation to invade the rights of its creditors
and cancel its indebtedness. Such legislation impairs the obliga-
tion of contract and is unconstitutional and void. Morris v. State,
62 Texas 728. The obligation to perform its contracts rests upon a
municipal corporation as well as upon a natural person, and a legis-
lative act which deprives a corporation of its charter cannot be con-
strued as relieving it from liabilities already incurred. This is a
matter of public policy, for a contrary rule would place persons con-
tracting with municipal corporations so completely at the mercy
of the legislature that it would be hard to find anyone willing to
contract with them. In the case of Smith v. Inge, 8o Texas 285,
the court said that the whole legislation abolishing the charter
and dissolving the municipal corporation of Mobile were enact-
ments which were unconstitutional and void because they impaired
the obligation of contracts, by destroying all remedies of the credi-
tors of the city for the enforcement of their demands.
Municipal corporations cannot extinguish their debts by chang-
ing their name or organizing under a new charter. A debt once
contracted by a municipal corporation will survive against what-
ever corporate entity is created to take its place and exercise pow-
ers over practically the same people and territory. An action at
law may be maintained against the new corporation as successor
of the former on a judgment recovered against the former before
dissolution. Hill v. Kahoka, 35 Fed. 32. The City of Mobile
being greatly indebted, the legislature passed an act repealing its
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charter and abolishing the city. On the same day an act was
passed incorporating the Port of Mobile which included nearly
all of the old city within its limits. In an action brought by a creditor
of the old city two questions were raised. I. Whether a preceding
creditor was entitled to a judgment against the Port of Mobile
on an obligation of the City of Mobile? 2. Whether the power of
taxation existing when the debt was created by the City of Mobile
could be enforced in favor of the creditor? Both questions were
decided in favor of the creditor and the court issued a mandamus
against the Port to compel payment. Mobile v. Watson, 116'U. S.
289. In Amy v. Selma, 77 Ala. 1O3, it was held that a new corpora-
tion named Selma created to replace one named City of Selma.
which had been dissolved, was its successor and liable for its debts.
See also Meyer v. Porter, 65 Cal. 67. A statute extinguishing one
corporation and throwing its obligations upon another raises an
implied promise on the part of the successor to pay the same.
Little v. Union Township Committee, 40 N. J. L. 397.
The power of taxation by a municipal corporation and its limi-
tations at the date of contract become part of the contract, and
continue in favor of a creditor under such contract without regard
to subsequent reductions of the limitation of the power. Morris
v. State, 62 Texas 728; U. S. v. Port of Mobile, 12 Fed. 768.
Where there is a mode provided by statute for levying taxes to
pay a debt, it is a part of the obligation, and any subsequent act
which affects rights under the contract is void. Siebert v. Lewis;
122 U. S. 284. Where a municipal corporation entered into a con-
tract while a law giving a remedy by compulsory taxation was in
force, the repeal of the law and the adoption of a new constitution
forbidding the levy of a tax in such case were held to be unconsti-
tutional and void as impairing the obligation of contract. Sawyer
v. Concordia, 12 Fed. 754. Although such legislation has been
plentiful the courts have been diligent in protecting the interests
of the creditors.
UNION REFRIGERATOR TRANSIT CO V. KENTUCKY. 199 U. S. 194.
This case came up on an attempt by the state of Kentucky to
tax the corporation, whigh does business under a Kentucky char-
ter, on 2o00 of its cars, which were all the cars owned and opera-
ted by the corporation in various states of the Union and of which
less than a hundred were operated in the state of Ken-
tucky. The plaintiff's contention is that only those cars operated
in the state of Kentucky, and therefore under its protection, should
be taxed and not those cars employed in other states in the prose-
cution of its business and therefore permanently located there.
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The attempted taxation is charged to be a violation of the due
process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Brown wrote the opinion sustaining the plaintiff's
contention, basing his decision 'on the following principles: the
power of taxation is exercised upon the assumption of an equiva-
lent rendered to the taxpayer in protection to his person or property
and in other matters; if the property is wholly within the taxing
power of another state to which it may be said to owe allegiance
and to which it looks for protection, and if the power attempting
to tax is not in a position to benefit or protect the property or per-
son to be taxed, the taxation, based merely upon domicile, partakes
rather of the nature of extortion than taxation; it is therefore
beyond the power of the legislature of Kentucky to lay such a
tax. It is to be observed that this case does not involve the ques-
tion of the taxation of intangible personal property, or of inheri-
tance or succession taxes, nor questions arising between different
municipalities or taxing districts within the same state.
Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Holmes agreed in the decision
arrived at but doubted the application of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the result.
THE RIGHT OF A CARRIER TO DEAL IN THE GOODS IT CARRIES.
Railroad rates and rebates, railroad regulations and remedies
have occupied the attention of the American public through
debates in Congress, comments in the newspapers and criticism
in the magazines to the exclusion, altogether, of other pressing
questions in world politics. The situation in this country upon
the subject resembles, to a marked degree, the present English
discussion on tariff reform; both seem to be universally misun-
derstood.
As a commentary upon the rate problem the recent opinion of
Mr. Justice White of the Supreme Court, showing as it does both
the strength and the weakness of the pregent legislation, is like a
bell in the fog of popular misconception. Considering the Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887 in a phase never before squarely
presented before it, the Supreme Court of the United States in
New York, N. H. &-J . R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce CoM., 26 Sup.
Ct. 27 , affirmed and enlarged an injunction granted below re-
straining the Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. from further executing
an agreement to deliver coal in New Haven at $2.75 per ton when
the cost of purchase of the coal at the mines, plus the cost of de-
livery and the published freight rates, aggregated $3.92 per ton.
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The case went upon the ground that the prohibitions in the sec-
ond, third and sixth sections of the act to regulate commerce con-
cerning any departure from the public rate "directly or indi-
rectly," any I undue or unreasonable preference or advantage, "
"undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" and "unjust
discrimination" were in direct conflict with the asserted right of
a carrier to sell the commodities which it transports at a price less
than the cost and the published rates, and to attribute the loss to
the company in its capacity as dealer and not as a carrier.
The court further increased the efficiency of the Interstate
Commerce Act by interpreting the prohibitions therein contained
as ever operative; from such a construction it is apparent that a
contract by a railroad to sell and transport coal at a stipulated
price comes within the prohibitions of the act whenever, from any
cause, the gross sum realized is insufficient to yield the market
rate of the coal plus the freight rate, although the contract may
not have been open to that objection when made. The reason for
this, according to Mr. Justice White, is that "This must be the
case in order to give vitality to the prohibitions of the Interstate
Commerce Act against the acceptance at any time by a carrier of
less than its published rates. We say this because we think it
obvious that such prohibitions would be rendered wholly ineffect-
ive by deciding that a carrier may avoid those prohibitions by
making a contract for the sale of a commodity stipulating for the
payment of a fixed price in the future and thereby acquiring the
power during the life of the contract to continue and execute it,
although a violation of the act to regulate commerce might arise
from doing so."
But, even granted that a violation of the act is thus prevented,
what would hinder a carrier from turning such a construction to
its advantage, and by raising its own freight rates-as it may law-
fully do if still reasonable (Int. Com. Act, see. 3),-render illegal
any unprofitable contract into which it might have entered?
The situation in respect to the great coal carrying railroads of
this country is at present anomalous. The "purpose of the act
to regulate commerce was to compel the carrier, as a public
agent, to give equal treatment to all," but in so far as that statute
was intended to affect all railroads alike, its object has been frus-
trated by the rulings of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
To-day there are two distinct classes of carriers of coal; (i) rail-
roads, such as the Chesapeake and Ohio, which are prohibited
from making any undue discrimination or departure from their
published rates by means of "dealing in the purchase and sale of
367
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coal;" and (2) other carriers, the D. L. & W. R. Co. and the
Lehigh Valley R. Co., being examples, which are not subject to
the provisions of the act as to rates and undue preferences, be-
cause of the administrative construction given to the statute by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Haddock v. D. L. & W .
R. Co., 4 I. C. C. Rep. 296, and Coxe Bros. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
4 I. C. C. Rep. 535, decided in x8go and x891. The controlling
consideration in these decisions was that the railroads in question
were, either by their charter or by legislative grant, existing at
the time of the adoption of the act, possessed of the commingled
attributes of carrier and producer, and hence, exempted from its
operation. The somewhat doubtful logic of these cases seems
to have been recognized by the commission in later holdings and
the principles there stated only regarded as applicable to strictly
identical cases. In re Unlawful Rates, 7 I. C. C. Rep. 33. Mr.
Justice White considered the Supreme Court bound by these rul-
ings, but rather significantly added: "at least, until Congress
has legislated on the subject."
The press throughout the country has taken for granted that
this decision places the American law upon the same footing as
the English doctrine, Att'y Gen. v. Great Northern R. Co. 29 L. I.
Ch. N. S. 794, and that the railroads are hereafter forbidden from
dealing in the goods they carry, but the wish, in this case, has
been father of the thought, as the court expressly refrains from
determining this question (p. 276) and limits its decision to a
denial of the rightof a railroad "to become a dealer under the cir-
cumstances stated," i e., when the price stipulated in the con-
tract does not pay the cost of purchase, the cost of delivery and
the published freight rates.
FEDERAL INTERFERENCE WITH STATE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIM-
INAL LAW.
In the case of the United States ex rel. .Drury &- another v.
Lewis, Warden of the Common Tail of Alleghany County, Penn., 26
Sup. Ct. 229, the Supreme court takes a very important stand
relative to interference by Federal courts in the state adminis-
tration of criminal law. It was held that the Circuit Court had
properly denied habeas corpus to persons in the military service of
the United States, held in custody of state authorities to answer
a charge of homicide which is asserted by them to have been com-
mitted in discharge of their duty, under the Federal Constution
and laws, to apprehend the deceased for larceny of property from
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the Federal arsenal, where the evidence was conflicting as to
whether the deceased had surrendered before the fatal shot and
where it also appeared that the shot was fired and took effect
outside the property of the United States and that the deceased
had no connection with the service of the United States.
It is a very important matter to the country and to the citi-
zens of the several states to know if their lives and property will
be under the protection of their own state courts or placed in the
hands of Federal authorities. So long as it is in the sound dis-
cretion of the Federal Supreme Court we may rest assured that
it will be decided correctly and in a way that will produce the
best results. It is a matter, however, about which the Court can-
not be too careful or the rights of the states too well guarded.
In the case of Re Neagle, 135 U. S. r, it was announced that
the matter was discretionary with the Supreme Court and in cases
of so exceptional a nature habeas corpus would be granted, freeing
the accused from the control of state officers. This case was
indeed exceptional and involved the question as to whether or
not the person and life of a Federal judge might be guarded from
assault.
Again in West Virginia v. Laing, 133 Fed. 887, the petition
was granted to prisoners who had been called upon to join a
,posse comitatus to capture a person indicted in the Federal courts
for resisting officers. It appears that the petitioner shot the
fugitive as he was about to assume a position very dangerous to
the lives of the posse. The sound discretion of the court was
exercised in this case, freeing the petitioner, for the act Was com-
mitted in the lawful discharge of a duty imposed on him by the
laws of the United States.
But there is a question in the case of Drury v. Lewis, as to
whether or not the deceased was shot after surrender and the
evidence is conflicting. It is certain, if he was, that the petitioner
did not fire in the performance of any duty prescribed by Federal
laws. So, the case presenting grounds for either jurisdiction, it
was for the state courts, having once taken jurisdiction, to
decide upon the evidence; and its right to do so could not be col-
laterally attacked. The Circuit Court properly declined to dis-
charge. The authority of the United States extends all over its
territory and it is supreme so far as its sovereignty extends and no
state can withhold from it the cognizance of any subject commit-
ted to it by the Constitution. Tennessee v. Davis, 1oo U. S. 257.
But it would be unsafe for the citizens of the different states as
well as demoralizing to the military service if it were understood
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that all the persons in that service should be exempt from state
prosecution for any criminal act committed against the citizens
of that state and in its jurisdiction, under color of official authority.
The rule, as gathered from the cases, seems to be that if the
act done was in the lawful discharge of a duty imposed by the
United States and was under the circumstances justified, the
Supreme Court will, ifi the exercise of its sound discretion, grant
the habeas coripus. West Virginia v. Zaing, 133 Fed. 887;
Re -Neagle, 135 U. S. I. This power is conferred in the U. S.
Revised Statutes, Sec. '753.
In a very interesting case in the 201 U. S., Kentucky v. Powers,
not yet in the advance sheets, the Supreme Court shows another
evidence of its intention to leave the state courts unmolested in
the exercise of their proper jurisdiction of crimes committed
within their boundaries. This case is a part of the very consider-
able prosecution resulting from the murder of the governor of
that state some years ago. The accused, after being granted his
fifth trial, sought to transfer the case to the Federal courts on the
ground that the state authorities had packed the juries so that
they were constituted of only men opposed to him politically and
that in this way he was denied due process of law and the equal
protection of the law. But Justice Harlan, writing the unani-
mous opinion of the court, says that this clause of the Constitu-
tion must be violated by the laws of the state and not by their
execution. If the laws are valid but executed badly by the trial
court the only relief is by appeal to the highest state courts.
